Inequality in Contemporary American Society
Professor Timothy Shortell
Sociology Department, Brooklyn College, CUNY.
Race and Ethnicity in America
s a result of the modern civil rights movement, race has been the backdrop of many events in our public life recently. Not too long ago, race was rarely discussed because prejudice and discrimination were assumed. Today, issues such as diversity and tolerance are more often at the center of our collective attention—and this is particularly true in New York City. Indeed, we are beginning to see a reaction to the seemingly relentless debate about "the race issue." Some people are expressing a weariness about the prominence of race in our civic culture.
Let's begin with a collaborative project on the subjective meanings of race and ethnicity.
As ubiquitous as the race issue is, however, Americans tend to see it in a very peculiar way. For many whites, the largest race group in the U.S., race is something that other people possess. The majority culture is seen as race neutral. American culture is equated with the majority culture—to be American is to be without race. Whites are more likely to think of themselves in terms of ethnicity than in terms of "whiteness."
"Race," when used in our public discourse, often refers to some aspect of non-European ethnicity. Why do Americans tend to think this way? To understand this, we need to examine the history of race in the U.S.
As a sociological concept, race is a structural variable. Race, in addition to being an attribute that individuals possess, plays a role in the organization of material and symbolic resources in our society. Race affects all of us, regardless of our particular character traits or behavior. Race contributes to our life chances and lifestyle, whether we are white, Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, or something else. Whether part of our self-definition or not, race affects the way we are perceived and the kind of challenges and opportunities we encounter in the course of our lives. As Weber would put it, race affects "life chances."
Today, sociologists interested in race are beginning to think about the social construction of race both in terms of what it means to be Black/Hispanic/Asian/etc. as well as what it means to be white. Precisely because the social distribution of resources is structured, in part, by race, to critically analyze race as a dimension of inequality requires that we recognize that in contemporary American society, whiteness is a source of privilege. As Jessie Daniels, a leading scholar on racism in America, notes: "'Whiteness' as a racial category is predicated on economic inequality as a key feature and mechanism in the perpetuation of the color line which separates us into two nations" (White Lies. New York: Routledge, 1997. p 13).
History of Race in America
merican history is, in many ways, a story of competing ideologies of race. Conflict over race stretches back to the very beginning of our country. Indeed, in the most significant political and social crisis in our history—the Civil War—blood was spilled to settle the question of whether or not African-Americans should be included in our Republican vision.
The Civil War, though, did not settle the issue of racial equality. Although American Blacks were granted the formal rights of citizenship by the federal government, the problem of racism remained. (See the text of the XIII, XIV and XV Amendments to the Constitution.) Even today, we continue to struggle with the legacy of slavery; discrimination and racism in social relations and institutions still plague us.
It may surprise you to learn that during the Colonial period, slavery was not a race issue. Many colonists complained that the Colonies inherited the institution from Britain. Some thought it was morally objectionable, but most tolerated it as a necessary evil. At the time, the class distinction between chattel slavery and indentured servitude was modest. For poor whites who had no other options, servitude was a means of securing a livelihood. (Parents might have to sell their children into servitude to secure their own subsistence, and provide for their children too, since it would have been impossible to support a family otherwise. Many entered into servitude themselves to pay for their passage to the New World.) Their existence was frequently as hard, and their status as lowly, as chattel slaves. Thus, servitude was about class, not race.
America was—and is—a country of immigrants, and discrimination based on religion and country of origin was commonplace in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Irish, for example, were often regarded as uncivilized by English and German Protestants. None the less, these differences were not integrated into a ideology of racial superiority in the minds of most Americans. As a result, groups once looked down upon, such as Irish and Italians, became a part of the mainstream culture.
As wage labor became the predominant economic system in the North, servitude (and apprenticeship) became less common. Sectional conflict emerged as the labor systems of the two regions became more antagonistic. As public opinion in the North turned against slavery, apologists in the South, such as George Fitzhugh and John C. Calhoun, developed a pro-slavery argument, which asserted that slavery was a just and necessary system. They equated slavery with race: Africans were incapable of the civilization associated with the Anglo-Saxons, and therefore, slavery was needed to ensure their well-being.
The pro-slavery argument hinged on the assertion of racial superiority. The idea that Anglo-Saxon culture was the highest form of human civilization was commonplace in the Colonial period and into the Republican age. (In general, every society tends to see itself as the high point of human development.) But it was not until the vigorous defense of slavery, in the early part of the nineteenth century, that theories of race difference were used to justify and legitimate servitude.
he Civil War decided the slavery question, but it left unsettled the issue of race. It might be expected, on the basis of logic, that as sentiment turned against slavery, opinion would also swing away from the ideology of racial superiority. After all, if race differences were used to justify a system that was judged illegitimate, it is reasonable to expect that the justification, itself, would be viewed with suspicion. As it turns out, though, this was not the case.
Americans embraced the ideology of racial superiority even as they fought to destroy slavery. Race riots occurred in several northern cities, including New York, in the early 1860s. Racist entertainment, such as minstral shows, flourished in this same period. After African-Americans gained legal status as humans and citizens, whites seemed more determined than ever to make clear that they would never be accepted as equals. During his tour of America in 1831, Alexis de Tocqueville noted, "Race prejudice seems stronger in those states that have abolished slavery than in those where is still exists, and nowhere is it more intolerant than in those states where slavery was never known. ... In the North the white man no longer clearly sees the barrier that separates him from the degraded race, and he keeps the Negro at a distance all the more carefully because he fears lest one day they be confounded together" (Democracy in America. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. p 343).
As labor historians, such as David Roediger, have shown, the early labor movement, which was developing at this time, cultivated a virulent racism.[ REF ] Even as various European ethnic groups were integrated into working class social movements, non-European ethnics (including Africans, Caribbeans, Hispanics and Asians, among others) were violently excluded.
In the century and a half since the Civil War, America has continued to wrestle with the ideology of racial superiority. With the victories of the modern civil rights movement, it has become somewhat less acceptable in mainstream public discourse to endorse the idea that whites are better than anyone else. But, as books such as The Bell Curve show, the ideology is still with us.[ REF ]
Moreover, anxiety about race differences lurks in various contemporary discussions, such as affirmative action, English as the official language in the U.S., and multicultural curricula in public schools. Social policy often encodes beliefs about race differences. For example, in the 80s and 90s, conservative politicians frequently made arguments about family structure and sexual morality that refer, however obliquely, to race differences, and these arguments found their way into the 1996 welfare reform.
Even though there are more whites than non-whites on public assistance, poverty is seen as a "minority" problem. Anxiety about race differences often leads to a hostility toward the poor. It is easier to blame poverty on individuals who are poor—rather than structural problems like un- and underemployment—if we accept that others who are different are not as good as us.
Race & Inequality
Race matters in the same sense that class matters: inequality in material and cultural resources. This inequality can be symbolized by educational attainment. According to 1997 data from the U.S. Census, about 14 percent of all African-Americans over the age of 25 had a college degree. Among Hispanics, about 9 percent had at least a bachelor's degree. About 24 percent of whites had earned at least a college degree in 1995. Asian-Americans were most likely to earn a degree, with about 42 percent having such a credential in 1997.
Differences in educational attainment, which are partly the result of inequality of opportunity (by race and class), produce substantial differences in income, as we saw earlier. Differences in income reproduce class inequality. For example, white families are more likely to own their own home. According to 1998 data from the U.S. Census, more than three out of four white families owned their primary residence. Among Black families, just over half were home-owners. Hispanic families were least likely to own, with under 50 percent so reporting.
In order to change inequality, we need to analyze the factors that produce and reproduce it. In this case, differential access to education leads to differences in labor market activity, which, in turn, generate inequality in income and wealth. But opening up educational access, all by itself, won't solve the problem. At each point in the cycle, race exacerbates the class differences. The ideology of racial superiority leads to both personal and institutional racism; beliefs about race differences foster practices which put Africans and Hispanics at distinct disadvantages.
For example, here in New York City, the state spends less per pupil for public schools than it spends per pupil outside the city. City schools have fewer resources and larger class sizes as a result. Students in NYC public schools are at a disadvantage relative to students outside the city. Of course, students in city schools are more likely to be Black, Asian and Hispanic. The consequences of this inequality are multiplied throughout the life course of these students.
To eliminate this form of institutional racism, the state would have to spend more on NYC schools. Because it is unlikely that voters would tolerate an increase in taxes to pay for the greater education costs, this money would have to come from other budgets, or, by reducing the amount spent on schools outside the city. Either way, residents in these communities are likely to feel that they are being held responsible for the inequality. Opposition often forms when people are asked to give up something for the sake of justice. Politicians from outside the city may believe that they have to resist changing the education budget out of fear of reprisals from angry constituents. To solve the problem of institutional racism, those who benefit from it will have to be willing to surrender their advantages. This is a difficult task.